Foundations of the Law: An Appetizer

You receive a speeding ticket. Plaintively, you ask why the speed limit was set at forty-five. It should be fifty-five, the speed you are told you were going. But the law’s the law, and the cost of fighting it in time and energy isn’t worth the hassle. So you pay the fine and forget about it. The story ends with only a thinner bank balance, a warier eye, and a mild sense of resentment. But give it a bit of thought and you will find in the episode a parable about the nature of the law.

Can you put it away? What is the source of that little niggling negative residue that remains? Why does the entire event leave you with a slightly bitter aftertaste, the bile of resentment?

Let me nurture that bile for a moment and ask you to interrogate it. Could it be you think the cop was wrong, that he acted out of some personal animus against you in picking you out from among a fleet of speeders? Probably not. But there is something personal about the resentment, isn’t there? Looking at it objectively, you can really find nothing to complain about in the transaction, can you? Should someone else have related the tale, you might have smiled and said, “Well, you were speeding, weren’t you?”

This sense of victimization makes little sense then, does it? But let us keep it alive for a moment longer. I think it is the trickle you see just before the dam breaks, the wisp of smoke before the whole place goes up in flames. And if you respond that I am being too apocalyptic, I ask you to transfer your attention to other, stronger resentments as you search your memory spanning the last week, perhaps over some news story or neighborly anecdote that leaves that same bitter aftertaste. That tinge of disgust over the ticket is the spume at the top of a tsunami of resentment so many of us feel for the intrusion of the law in our lives. What can it mean?

Only one thing. It speaks in our inarticulate whisper or in the screams of protesters in the street, “The law is unjust.” Now even facing that simple declaration is too difficult for some, for even thinking it compels us to examine the nature of that injustice, leading to further tiresome consideration of the nature of justice as it relates to the law. And that topic seems just too difficult to think about. Only it isn’t.

Justice is a very simple concept at its root. It means “to give to each her due.” Now that might lead to asking who gives and what is due. These are fair questions that lead us further down the investigative path, but first let us narrow it a bit. We can eliminate for the purposes of this discussion a wide view of justice, say between individuals, in favor of considering the provenance of law.

At this point we should probe your resentment over getting the ticket. First, we face the question of fairness. Your complaint over being singled out from among the flock of speeding cars is an appeal to fairness, which can be defined as treating individuals who are the same as the same as well as treating individuals who are different as different in ways appropriate to those distinctions. So no question the cop treated you unfairly. Lots of cars were breaking the speed limit. But a moment’s honest thought should dissuade you from thinking fairness and justice to be identical. By that standard no murderer should ever be punished if even one ever escapes arrest. Every moral rule relies on the principle of “ought implies can,” which correctly argues that no one should be held morally responsible for a choice unless she is able to make the choice. Christianity tells believers they ought to love everyone equally. They can’t. So that moral obligation is empty. We must rephrase the moral rule to make it something we can do. Just as Christians limit their love to those they come in contact with, the policeman found himself limited in his trolling for speeders. It is fine to say that cop ought to have ticketed all those speeders, but as he could not catch all of them, he caught those he could. That would be you. But you might protest, if the ticket was not fair, how can it be just? It can be because you deserved it. The law set a speed limit and you violated it. You earned that ticket. It was your due.

But wait, you say. The law may set the speed limit at whatever pleases it, but how does that obligate me? I was driving safely, felt completely in control. That speed limit was set too low. The law was wrong.

Now you have really stepped in it! Just to be clear, you are claiming that the set speed limit, the law, was unjust. You were not due that ticket. Now how could you hope to justify that kind of claim? So you turn the question back on the judge (the one you never got to meet: you paid the fine, remember?). How could she justify setting the speed limit so low? What gives the legislature who delegated the agency or whatever the right to set it at all? And while we are at it, let’s not stop there. What gives any law the right to compel your obedience?

At this point you might be tempted to step back from the ledge you’ve put yourself on with some very commonsense observations. After all, you concede, somebody has to decide. We can’t just go as fast as we want to. There would be wrecks. People would be killed. Chaos. If you are easily placated, you might lightly chide yourself at this point for your resentment over the ticket and try to let it go. If you are more stubborn, you will think the highway department, or the traffic engineer, or whoever made up that ridiculous speed limit was as incompetent as government itself, and so you might return to questioning the right of the government to set this law. To set any law. Just how arbitrary is this business of the law? At this point, you are challenging the totality of legal authority. That rational challenge is a problem though, for reasons you have already identified. Something has to justify laws, doesn’t it? But merely by questioning, much less rejecting, its right to do that, you have begun to dissolve its authority, meaning the trust that sustains its powers of moral suasion, for the act of challenge dissolves authority utterly. You were right to feel uneasy about this line of thought. For now that you ponder it, your trust has evaporated along with an easy acceptance of every law you are expected to follow, leaving only the core question: what does warrant the law?

The thought experiment just related encapsulates a pretty good interrogation of that question as it pertains to our everyday lives, a challenge every citizen has the duty to throw down and every government to answer. And in truth you did more than complain. You also made a stab at theory that captures one of three serious justifications for granting power over our liberties to the law. But it is neither the oldest nor the best one….

If tradition could impart power, we might still be genuflecting at the altar of the most ancient justification for legal legitimacy: divine command. Every government of every stripe found the ultimate answer to the questions posed above in the power of a deity to command obedience. This was a worldwide phenomenon. It characterized all the means of political affiliation that history has proved feasible. If tribalism, dynasticism, or nationalism proved insufficient for social cohesion, it was sure to be fortified with theocracy to add divine authority to its decrees (see “Which Clash of Civilizations?”). We see the conjunction of these appeals from ancient Egypt, where pharaoh-worship boosted dynasticism, to contemporary Argentina, where Catholicism to this day burnishes the patina of the nation-state. For most of human history, it was inconceivable to imagine a law without divine heft to stiffen its spine. The most naked exercise of power could, it was thought, be redeemed if “God wills it.” Considering that a tenet of divine command was that the deity not only enforces but defines justice as it wills (see “Divine Justice”), it is not surprising either that it has enjoyed such widespread appeal among rulers eager to compel obedience or that it eventually found itself rejected by those who sought a more intelligible basis for law After all, remember how angry you were at the perceived injustice of that ticket!

I have examined both the moment of that rejection (see “Why Invent a Social Contract?”) and its cause (see “The Fragility of Religious Authority”) in the past, so I see no need to review that moment of transference when political affiliation found itself desperate for new foundations. If you felt a bit of vertigo when you began questioning your ticket, consider the disorientation felt in western civilization when the most ancient and revered basis for governmental authority collapsed into chaos! To be more precise, that moment lasted nearly two centuries, from 1517-1688, and, as you might imagine, it was pretty ugly (see “Modernism’s Midwives”). The actual divorce from divine command was only sealed in that glittering year, 1776.

Now we get to your theory, the one that challenged and replaced divine command. Why do we need laws? You responded in a predictable fashion this way: because we need order to prevent chaos. Congratulations. You are an American! Your answer is the same one that supports the founding of the United States. We know it as the social contract. The essence of social contract theory is that government is the product of a conventional compact among citizens who agree to limit some of their own freedoms in the interest of social order. Please correct me if I am mistaken, won’t you? Isn’t this what you were thinking when you said that somebody had to set that speed limit and, though you might have set it higher, you must bow to the general will of the majority that chose to set it lower? Now this is undeniably the case, as far as it goes. The problem, I think, is that it doesn’t go far enough (see “Alienation of Civil Affection”).

The essence of this justification is that it seeks no warrant for political affiliation beyond some pragmatic or convenient arrangement. It judges success by the same means as politicians do: by approval ratings. Social contract is wonderfully malleable. It works with any of the old forms of political affiliation: tribalism, dynasticism, nationalism, even theocracy. The distinction, of course, is that it seeks its power from below, rather than from above, from the majority of the people rather than from God. And that is quite important. But in practical terms this may be a distinction without a difference, for the legal warrant turns out to be equally authoritarian (see “When Is Civil Disobedience Justified?”). The individual who disagrees with a law is bound in the same way by divine command and social contract. He may protest to God as Job’s chorus did or to the majority as minorities have in more recent years, but his recourse is equally circumscribed. The problem is that he has nothing to appeal with, nothing to point to in a plea for justice. If you go before the judge, what could be your defense for exceeding the posted speed limit? You may be hazy on the exact mechanism, but something tells you that law was a product of some democratic process, that somehow you had some indirect say in its passing, though now you challenge whatever majority view produced it. That’s the social contract at work.

Our culture nudges us toward acceptance of that view not only because it greases the skids of our own lives by discouraging dissent but also because it forces its logic on our view of other political entities. If we get to choose our own laws, then every other political union may with equal justice choose its own laws organically from its own cultural conditions. And isn’t that what democracy demands? But consider two disturbing logical consequences of this conclusion. First, nothing in social contract mandates an acceptance of the general will except its raw power. Under a social contract arrangement, the minority is in the same relationship with the majority as the majority would be to a dictatorial ruler in a tyranny: they are obliged to follow the laws without recourse. We have no trouble condemning a dictatorship that oppresses the majority, yet we excuse the same inflexibility when 50% plus one oppresses the minority. Why is that? What sanctifies the will of a majority culture? What gives it a moral superiority to a minority, one sufficient to allow it the power to define what is just as whatever it wishes? I submit this is an insoluble problem for social contract theory, one responsible for at least some of your resentment over your ticket (see “Two Senses of the Common Good”). The second problem follows inevitably from the first. If government is the result of an agreement by a culture to establish self-rule in any conventional form it wishes, what prevents minority cultures from withdrawing from the majority to govern themselves to whatever degree they think appropriate? After all, isn’t this the principle of nullification that moves many libertarians and states rightists, one tacitly recognized by the powers of state and local governments? If government is born of conventional agreements in self-selected groupings, what prevents cultures of any size from valuing their identity over the majority, down to family, and even all the way down to the individual who is, after all, the atomic unit of the social contract justification for government in the first place? Seen in this light, you, a culture of one, decidedly did not contract to that law, the proof being that you chose to break it. Further proof being that now you resent being spanked by it. Final proof being that your resentment is now making you not only frustrated but also confused. After all, you can’t fight City Hall! But that realization arises from the obvious question: what would you fight City Hall with? If social contract somehow obligates us to some agreement we may disapprove of, how can it be called just? Your ticket certainly did not rise to the level of oppression, but if it did, how could you justify a rejection of a majority rule that defines justice to be what it wills? Can’t the majority in a culture be wrong in that will for itself and, even more likely, can’t it wrong subcultures and individuals who question its will? By what standard could they justly challenge the social contract justification that deprives them of the ability to arbitrate the very definition of justice itself? If “what is due” is so elastic as to be defined by the general will, what can a dissenter appeal to? None seems possible if laws are synonymous with what the majority wants. But if they aren’t, what else can they be?

It is this hermetic and closed quality of social contract that places it in a class of justifications called legal positivism that makes up a second theory of law. It differs from divine command in that it can erect no clear external warrant for law. The majority replaces God as the source of justice, which flows up from the majoritarian contract rather than down from an absolute divinity; both make no space for appeal. It requires adherents to define justice as equivalent to established law. In practice, the dissenter in social contract theory faces the same dead end as the heretic in divine command. When you sought to dismiss your resentment with the adage, “the law’s the law,” you were appealing to legal positivism. The reason “you can’t fight City Hall” from within this theory is that you have no higher ground from which to challenge its rules.

Every appeal to legal positivism works in just this way. It regards the law as an inert and unquestionable thing and our relationship to it as equally fixed. Lawyers must approach the law in this fashion; otherwise, legality would be a moving target. Political theorists who regard constitutions and precedents as adequate justifications for law do too. Postmodernists (see Postmodernism Is Its Discontents”) must see law as positivist because they recognize no objective morality that might direct or limit it. The result is a cultural relativism that regards existing legal arrangements as beyond reproach.

And that bothers us. Or at least it should if only because we are oh so familiar with too many instances of the law being wrong. Wrong for minorities. Wrong for majorities, for that matter. But what does “wrong” mean in a theory that defines “right” by the will of the majority or the letter of the law? Something tells us a hermetic theory of government that defines justice as “whatever we say it is” rings too many twentieth century alarm bells, dredges up too much Jim Crow, too many Nuremberg Decrees, too much apartheid, too many tinpot dictators. Experience tells us it is both hubristic and dangerous.

The only choice is to appeal to a standard beyond the positive law, but how can we find one? What contemporary and universal standard could add a moral appeal to the law to shore it up with something beyond pragmatics, self-interest, and convention? This is obviously such a heavy carry yet also such a necessary one that we see a continuing appeal to return to a pure divine command solution to accomplish it, but that approach is historically doomed for three reasons. First, in this climate as opposed to the medieval age, we can find no unity in the divine voice. Second, political power has irrevocably relocated to the individual. Third, the trust that authority relies on for its warrant has been utterly shattered (see “Authority, Trust, and Knowledge”), so much so that all institutional authority suffers from a failure of its warrant. These causes have played themselves out most dramatically in the founding of the United States (see “Theocracy and the Commandments”) and are unlikely to be renegotiated in a pluralistic and secular society.

Nevertheless, we still see appeals to it, diluted by a recognition of history perhaps, but no less vivid for that. The reason, I think, is that many persons simply cannot imagine a personal moral standard not based on divine command, much less a political one, yet they also recognize the impossibility of imposing that authority on a polity that embraces social contract theory, despite that theory’s glaring flaws.

Even the most advanced moral leaders in our zeitgeist seem boxed in by the need to find some deeper source of moral suasion than positive law without returning to a divine command rationale. And so we see the kind of hybrid and disjointed effort typified by Martin Luther King’s Letter from a Birmingham Jail. This is an inspiring appeal to civil disobedience. It was obviously in Dr. King’s interest to challenge the dictates of positivist law as unjust and to defend a theory of justice that would confront it. He references “justice” and “injustice” a total of thirty-eight times in his famous argument for nonviolent civil disobedience, yet he seems unable to provide a clear warrant for his judgment that Alabama’s actions have been unjust to black Americans. He baldly claims, “I am in Birmingham because there is injustice here.” One might expect him to follow that bald assertion with some evidence or analysis, but what follows are a series of allusions to historic heroes of resistance: Amos, Paul, Socrates, Jesus, and Luther. He claims Birmingham to be the most unjust city in the nation because of its segregation laws, and so assaults positivist law directly. He continues to accuse its courts of injustice as well, a second attack. He reminds us that “Everything Hitler did…was legal…” But he quickly avers, “We have waited for more than 340 years for our constitutional and God-given rights.” This appeal to positive law is confusing since until 1954 the courts had justified segregation and, of course, Alabama’s laws still did, both sets of laws constitutionally authorized. The reader at this point expects a pivot to the traditional alternative to positivist warrants, one foreshadowed by his earlier admiration for religious rebels and his brief mention of “God-given rights.” So may we assume his partial rejection of positivist law moved Reverend King to a clear absolutist warrant, one built upon the traditional foundation of authority? Not really. “So often the contemporary church is a weak, ineffectual voice with an uncertain sound. So often it is an archdefender of the status quo. Far from being disturbed by the presence of the church, the power structure of the average community is consoled by the church’s silent–and often even vocal–sanction of things as they are. But the judgment of God is upon the church as never before.”

At this point in the letter Dr. King’s charge of injustice seems justified by neither positivist law including social contract nor religious authority as exemplified by his co-religionists. To his credit, he recognizes the difficulty. “Since we so diligently urge people to obey the Supreme Court’s decision of 1954 outlawing segregation in the public schools, at first glance it may seem rather paradoxical for us consciously to break laws. One may well ask: ‘How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?’ The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that ‘an unjust law is no law at all.’ Now, what is the difference between the two? How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust?” Having laid out his premise, Dr. King now offers the nut of his argument. “A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law.” He continues to defend his position by referencing the thinking of Martin Buber and Paul Tillich, two postwar theologians who rooted morality in relational terms.

We see in this, Dr. King’s only real foray into warrant, the disconnect between the tectonic shift in value he advocates and the justifications he offers to validate it. Without doubt, the majority of citizens of Alabama opposed not only the changes Dr. King’s letter advocates but also the means by which he seeks to procure them. Almost without exception, the segregationists, political moderates, and clergy he disparages in his famous letter considered themselves devout religionists whose opposition could be validated by Biblical authority, long tradition, current culture, and settled law. Yet here Dr. King seems to be disputing the morality of some laws while upholding others, respecting one source of religious authority while rejecting others. As beautifully phrased and poetic as his argument is, it fails as a rational case for civil disobedience, advancing a confusion about its moral foundations that allows his enemies an easy escape from the charge of injustice that inspires his protest. We are forced to ask why.

To a religionist like Dr. King, arguing that God created man to be thus and so and created law to do this and such is a corollary to the axiom that God wills the world and that his will is good. But as the authority for Dr. King’s claims is disputable by those who interpret God’s will differently, as Birmingham’s white citizenry undoubtedly did, the corollary could be easily disputed without doubting the axiom from which it was derived, meaning segregationists could consider themselves good Christians as they dismissed Dr. King’s definition of injustice and its implicit demand for redress, particularly when his condemnation of fellow pastors explicitly raises the question of why their religion is wrong and his right. Here we see an old, old blind spot for believers in religious authority, the very issue that demolished it as a consensual foundation for law in the Reformation (see “Religion and Truth”). It is irrational to presume that the same authority can justify two opposed positions, yet authority in itself is incapable of resolving the conflict and must appeal to some other means of resolution. Historically, that means was social contract theory, but it is that very cultural consensus that has produced the injustice that Dr. King is protesting in Birmingham. He champions a minority against a majority in a polity that has given the majority the power to define justice as it sees fit. He champions an interpretation of religious authority clearly at odds with other religious authorities, that disagreement properly dissolving any warrant on that score. His argument at his point may be inspiring to his allies, but it must remain opaque to the opponents he wishes to convince. He seems unable to find the warrant to make any charge of injustice stick. You can’t fight City Hall.

But as tied to religious absolutism as his rhetoric is, we see an embryonic argument for a different kind of justification, though sketchy and inconsistently framed. His religiosity considered it a complement to a more powerful divine command, but for those who read divine will differently or reject our ability to know it, this position makes an independent kind of argument, one impossible to tease out of a religious claim unless its adherent explicitly denies divine command as a warrant, something Dr. King was certainly unwilling to do.

When he says, “A just law is a man made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God,” his religious convictions lead him to think the moral law most powerfully warranted by the law of God. In this, he has august precedent, for all of the religious luminaries he cites as authority for his position thought the same. But his own argument undercuts the relationship between what God wills and what justice demands because other authorities doubt his understanding of what God wills, though Dr. King seems not to appreciate that. On the contrary, his deep disappointment with Christian moderates and clergy critical of his position reveals his inability to separate the moral law from religious authority and either from the positive law that should reflect them. But this position has been challenged since the Protestant Reformation that inspired both Dr. King’s denomination and the profound distrust of religious authority that allowed it to flourish. In truth, the paragons of civil disobedience he references, the “creative extremists” he admires, universally violated both positive law and established religious authority, upholding a “higher law” in their place. And Dr. King makes repeated if inconsistent appeals to that same higher law and urges his readers to do the same, though his effort is muddied by his confusion over its source and its locus of power. He very briefly mentions it as “natural law.” And this is the third justification for law that might have allowed Dr. King to fight City Hall, only he was unable to disentangle it from the divine command justification that he as well as many of his segregationist enemies regarded as absolute.

What he at least intuited as a root of law is a common reasoning power that should bridle at the inequity of treating some as less than human. This argument may be inconsistently supported in Scripture and so may be veiled to divine command adherents. It may be (and was) ignored by the social contract theorists who enshrined the three-fifths rule in the Constitution as a majoritarian compromise. It may be (and was) ignored by well-meaning moderates who warned Dr. King against violating positive law. But despite being disputed by religious tradition, majority will, and written law, it is a conclusion indisputably dictated by reason. Tribalism had made the argument difficult to advance, and at least a part of that difficulty may be laid at the feet of religionists who found other persons’ gods motive enough to question their humanity. Though Dr. King makes no sustained appeal to it, he repeatedly and implicitly reminds his readers of the illogic of those who preach equity while enforcing inequity, who allow a majority to impose laws on a minority that they would never allow to be imposed on themselves, who beat children in defense of community, who break contracts without repercussions, and who act contrary to religious beliefs they profess to hold. These are fundamentally rational arguments rooted in a rationalist value system noticeable in Dr. King’s letter most clearly by its absence. Its basis is the principle of non-contradiction, the most powerful test of rationality we know of. Sadly, Dr. King could hardly appeal to that principle while the inconsistency of his argument was violating it.

So what is this third warrant for the power of law and what is its source?  As originally framed during the heyday of divine command, natural law theory was a subsidiary one dependent on the power of the deity to define justice and command obedience, yet though it may be seen to complement God’s plan, it need not be reliant on it. Its roots trace to Aristotle, who saw in the rationally apprehensible order of nature a structure entirely consistent with religious belief. Things, he said, are made for a purpose. They fit together in a larger order that sustains reality. Rain waters crops, so we may say that is its purpose. Crops feed animals. Animals sustain man. Man… His assumption was that all things, man included, have a niche and a role to play in the great structure of nature. He called that role a thing’s formal cause. Most of nature must participate in that process, and so things move toward a final cause, a completion, that fulfills their formal cause in the natural order of events. But persons are not things, and so may choose a whole range of choices, not all congruent to their formal cause, so they find themsleves having to use their own reasoning to tease out their moral life through experience. Aristotle built an entire system of morality on those choices and called it virtue ethics (see “A Virtue Ethics Primer”). This was in the fourth century before Christ. It was inevitable that the long reign of divine command that warranted law for thousands of years would domesticate what Aristotle thought of as a secular philosophy and tailor it to religious purposes. The paragon of this position was Thomas Aquinas, who so clearly structured Dr. King’s view of the issue. In Aquinas’s worldview, every warrant had to bow to divine command. Man’s formal cause must be derived from his created religious nature and from God’s plan for his salvation, though our sinful nature made success uncertain. Religious social institutions thus were legitimized in the divine command tradition by a natural law gloss. For a thousand years after the fall of Rome in the West, extant political structures were defended without exception by recourse to “natural law.” The religious overlay was too tempting: it assumed “whatever is, is right,” while yielding to that old temptation to stiffen the law with divine authority. If the dictates of that law seemed unjust, they must be viewed as either a delusion or an injustice to be corrected in the afterlife. It is little wonder that the theories of political identity rooted in social contract that rejected divine command in the wake of the Reformation found much to dislike about the religious roots of natural law theory. But experience has shown much to dislike about social contract theory and legal positivism too, particularly in the twentieth century.

Though always distinct from divine command, natural rights theory has found support from biological and neurological science only in our own generation as these true empirical studies began to supersede the twentieth century’s unfortunate reliance on the human sciences (see “The Calamity of the Human Sciences”). One need not appeal to divine support for a formal cause. It seems evolution has fated humans to be a certain kind of being in the world, one that has species-specific needs and species-specific means of satisfying them (see “Needs Anchor Morality”), and those means may be deduced by a reasoning capability that is the source of the human dignity that Dr. King defended in Birmingham.  Rather than look for legitimacy to some specious contract resultant from some equally delusional realization made in some imagined state of nature, we might turn to our own needs as we experience them and the political rights they necessitate (see “Needs and Rights”) to find the measure of positive law.

Such a rotation handily eliminates the sense of outrage you felt for getting that ticket. Yes, you might have felt you were driving safely at fifty-five miles per hour, but are you willing to risk your own and someone else’s life on that judgment (see “Our Freedom Fetish”)? Is it worth the risk of injuring yourself or others if your judgment is mistaken? Do you consider yourself as qualified to judge the safe speed as the experts who laid the road and evaluated its conditions (see “Expertise”)? Do you trust every other driver coming in the opposite direction to exercise the same level of autonomy to decide on his own “safe” speed? Considering all the goods government delivers to you, can you dilute your indignity with gratitude for a civil order that is generally a just one, which allows you to fulfill your needs and uses law as an implement to encourage your recognition and fulfillment of those needs? If not, even if you can find a way to defend your own judgment to these objections, do you think that slowing down to forty-five miles per hour violates your rights (see “Natural and Political Rights”), which is tantamount to say it deprives you of your needs?

I didn’t think so. But if your interrogation convinces you of the opposite, then you should regret not taking your case to court and defending your case before the judge on the grounds of a natural rights theory of law. That too is a duty to justice, a duty Dr. King was alluding to and willing to die for. By such metrics and such measures are laws made, judged, and perfected, but that process depends on first nesting them in the embrace of justice.

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