We think and speak in declarative sentences. Each declaration proclaims a truth, and every truth is built upon some support, a warrant, that we think makes it true. That warrant in its turn is based upon some assumption that relates it to the claim, an axiom of commitment that we accept as a given and would never consider questioning in the ordinary blur of daily life. My declaration that the cat is on the table assumes my capacity for sight, my mind’s ability to categorize discrete items in reality, and the transparency of language. And that is before either I or my listener checks to see if the cat is there. So the truths that well up into our minds and gush forth from our lips (and everybody else’s) are only the pointy tip of the pyramid.
In times of consensus, these truth claims go unexamined for the very good reason that no one bothers to question them. But when agreement collapses, conflicting claims to truth and goodness must appeal to a warrant acceptable to all disputants. These are consensual truth tests that both sides agree to submit to. I might say your argument contradicts itself, or you might accuse me of ignoring some evidence we both would find compelling. But whether you think contradiction or I think your evidence to be valid relies on deeper and often unexamined assumptions about the capacities of reason or the meaning of “evidence.” So simply offering warrants may not be sufficient. Verification depends on our agreeing to the axioms that underwrite truth claims as clearly as it depends on the warrants themselves. When both the public warrants for our claims and the axioms that allow them fall into general disagreement, cultures enter unsettling periods of contention that can only be resolved when disputants agree to new axioms allowing new consensual warrants with which to examine their claims to truth, goodness, and beauty.
Western society seen two such breakdowns in the last five hundred years.
Historians call the first and more cataclysmic one the Protestant Reformation (1517-1688). Authority, a warrant built upon an axiomatic trust in the truth and goodness of some higher power, had served as the final arbiter of all disputes in the thousand years after the fall of Rome. For all the violence of the Middle Ages, legitimacy was assumed to reside in the consensual acceptance of a hierarchical order with God as its guarantor. The collapse of that order was especially brutal for two reasons. First, authority had mortared over the patchwork of competing powers that had preserved some remnants of civilized life in early medieval life. Its loss unleashed an explosion of dissension. Those tensions were disastrously magnified by a second problem: an inherent deficiency in the nature of authority as warrant that can only arise when trust is doubted. Because all truth and goodness claims relied upon the trust of adherents for its power, when that trust was revoked, competing authorities found themselves with no means to resolve their conflicting claims to truth and goodness. Trust was the only guarantor, and once challenge was considered, the commitments that trust allowed had to be reexamined and reallocated by the rational agency of the adherent. And that re-appropriation must erode trust and by extension the authority it allowed. As Catholic battled Lutheran and moderate fought radical, and sect warred upon sect within them, disputants found no common authority to resolve their conflicting claims to truth and goodness. Trust faltered, failed, and dissolved until adherents began questioning not only their own trust but the nature of authority itself. Over eight generations of religious carnage, all the interlocking layers of social and political authority found themselves teetering on the abyss of total rejection.
This crisis gave birth to modernism, which supplanted premodern authority over a dismal and bloody two centuries of groping for axioms consensually acceptable to the warring factions. What finally came into focus was a reliance by individuals on universal reason and private experience as imperfect replacements for lost trust. This intellectual revolution also required a shift in moral agency from authority to the thinking minds of persons who now must examine truths by their own lights and negotiate their findings with others. The nature of that reason and the reliability of that experience has posed a continuing riddle ever since . Four specific means gradually allowed individuals to subject their experience to rational scrutiny : empiricism (which only gradually became modern science), expertise, competence, and undistilled experience, “undistilled” referencing the unique nature of the experience. Their order is important for it signals the diminishing power of experience to prove reliable when examined in the light of reason, with science’s methodology seriously limiting the experiences it investigates and undistilled experience, the kind of breathless choosing that characterizes much of our everyday life, seriously limiting the degree of reason that can be applied to its blurring of analysis. While these truth tests proved superior to authority in one respect — they allowed individuals to examine their declarations according to their own agency and gradually improve their reliability — they could never offer the lost certainty of authority or provide the same level of consensus, This tentativeness stemmed from two causes. First, religious authority emulsified its truth and goodness claims into one moral composite. The claims of the powerful were true because they were ultimately authorized by God, and they were good for the same reason. When trust collapsed, the truth and goodness of declarations had to be isolated and examined separately. And because this process relied on individuals’ own capacity to decide, dissent proliferated. The general acceptance of modern axioms also explains why medievalism seems incredibly remote to the modern mind, but in some persons uncomfortable with the tentativeness of science and other modern truth tests, the magisterial voice of authority still provokes a powerful nostalgia.
The second great crisis was both slower and deeper. The discontents of modernism emerged strongly in the Romantic movement of the nineteenth century. It was fueled by the birth of popular culture that magnified the inadequacies of modernist warrants and by the hypocrisy of efforts to combine the discriminating power of reason with a passionate embrace of raw, individual experience. This was hardly the only hypocrisy Victorianism produced. No modernist warrant could replace the power of trust for moral claims, least of all the empiricism that coursed through Victorian life in an orgy of invention. These and many other inconsistencies indicted its moral values at the precise moment in history that they began to permeate the non-Western world.. These woes included the effort to emulsify the contradictory powers of public order and individual autonomy, of Romantic passion and Enlightenment reason, of individual agency and the remnant authority of church and king, and of science and belief. The resultant moral confusions fertilized the abuses we are all so familiar with: imperialism, racism, misogyny, materialism, scientism, and artistic alienism. Awareness of such failures built gradually, at least until the turn of the twentieth century. World War I brought modernism to the same point of crisis that medievalism had suffered in the Reformation. But what alternative axioms could survive a frank analysis of that war, “Western civilization’s attempt to commit suicide”? The frantic search produced a whirlwind of novelty in the first two decades of the twentieth century. A new and furious intellectual scavenger hunt had begun.
The solution required rejecting not only modernism but even the more basic axiom that had supported both modernism and premodernism. This was the assumption that any correct response to reality must correspond to it in some reflective way. This correspondence theory had formed the foundation of all earlier claims to truth, but modernism hacked upon its very root as it chopped away at the reliability of private perception and our reasoning about it. Doubts mushroomed during the nineteenth and twentieth century in response to the gross hypocrisies that had produced the Great War. On what grounds could truth, goodness, and beauty be built if not their relationship to external reality?
The answer to that question was cobbled together using bits and pieces of the intellectual criticism modernism had endured from its beginnings. A clear theory only emerged in the 1970’s after a half-century of shrill cultural contention waged against modernism by conservatives nostalgic for the loss certainty of authority and radicals keenly aware of the inconsistencies of the modern warrant. The new view was postmodernism, and its novel means of resolution was simply to cut off truth and goodness claims from any need for external verification. No reality was necessary other than an individually created one, and no common reasoning was required to make sense of private experience. But some filtering mechanism must discriminate among a torrent of perceptions and reflections we all entertain. The postmodern means of warranting this virtual circle of individually assembled truths was their internal consistency rather than any correspondence to externals. The individual had been the source of truth for the modernists, so why not take that axiom all the way? Why not give power and weight to whatever the individual chooses to value: intuition, insight, imagination, emotion, dreams, unconscious desires, strongly held beliefs, or myth? Modernism had elevated individual rational agency, so why not honor the unique interpretations that reason brought to private experience? Philosophy called such an internal schema coherentism, but the cadre of mostly French intellectuals who produced a coherent postmodern theory added a brilliant twist to the older notion by first urging a heroic rejection of conformism, and once their theories had saturated modern cultures, by considering cultures themselves to be the source and measure of coherence, thus giving rise to an identity politics that requires no justification beyond abstaining from hypocrisy to achieve consistency…and therefore truth, goodness, and beauty.
By the turn of the 21st century, the defects of such a view began to come into focus, for cultures in postmodern theory could no more find means to resolve conflict than could the individuals who compose them, and if they assumed the task of defining truth for their members, what might limit their legitimacy? For a culture is simply a repository of values applicable to particular experiences, and each of us participates in innumerable numbers of them. A promiscuous approval of cultural coherence requires also that we sanction every culture’s value system, which necessarily precludes favoring one over others in the inevitable case of conflict. This impotence to arbitrate moral dispute is insoluble by postmodern theory, leading to an obsession with power structures and an intractable clash of moral disputants reminiscent of the worst impasses of the Reformation. This is the postmodern dilemma, but it does not operate in a vacuum. Modernism continues to offer its own warrant, shorn of some but not all of its more offensive errors. And premodern authority continues to lure at least some persons to its comforting certainties despite the hostility of both modernists and postmodernists and the loss of its appeal in an age of cultural diversity.
All of this is history. But the shredding of consensus that is history’s legacy exacts its contemporary price. It requires us to go beyond our own simple declarations of what is true, what is good, and what is beautiful and beyond our warrants for them, for we face no consensus that gives them force. The simplest terms we use to make our truth claims have been compromised (see “The Axioms of Moral Systems“). They depend for their meaning on the axioms we adopt and the kind of warrant we embrace as we speak them, any of which our listener might not share at that moment, that we ourselves might reverse without compunction in the next moment. Being attentive to warrant and axiom complicates our declarations, but it also restores their meaning. The alternative is to thrust all declarations concerning truth, goodness, and beauty into doubt, which describes the moral crisis that faces us today.
This crisis affects private and public life, but to explore it by reference to these categories calls for a means to distinguish and limit either sphere of moral concern (see “The Moral Bullseye”). I develop that distinction in the essays on this site and include what I hope is enough context to allow each entry to stand alone. This private/public separation is uncommon but productive because it underscores the undeniable need for a consensual means to resolve disputes among persons in the public square, including political remedies that are now mired in confusion. I recommend The Deep Simple: The Terms of Public Morality as a comprehensive treatise.