It is difficult to be a pure correspondentist or a pure coherentist in ordinary living. We are too dependent on perception and lack the self-discipline to be consistently one or the other, and so long as we focus on the pragmatic outcomes of our choices about truth, goodness, and beauty, we muddle through. But our regret over error and our yearning for better leads us always toward some simpler and, we hope, more workable view of these two opposing modes of justification. Our dissatisfaction is rooted in the complementary flaws in each mode of verification. Correspondence resolves dispute but has limited application. Coherence applies to many of our mental constructions—ideas, beliefs, emotions, imaginations, but it invariably fails to settle disputes. Our perennial dissatisfaction with either modality thrusts us toward novel attempts to find the golden key that gives us maximal reliability. What would that look like? What new problems would it engender? We are always looking for the best way to slice this pie.
The neatest choice would be perfecting one or the other. To be a pure correspondentist would be to see all claims to truth, goodness, and beauty as declarations about external reality verifiable by their correspondence to actual entities. Any sentence we speak that does not correspond to that requirement could be an exclamation, interjection, question, or command but could not be declarative. To say, “The cat is on the table,” when perceptual evidence indicates otherwise to any observer would be either a lie or nonsense. Our culture’s exemplar of such a mind would be the experimental scientist who applies very strict rules of perception and reasoning to arrive at her truth claims. To be a pure coherentist would thrust one into solipsism, the condition of doubting the reality of anything outside the perceptual wall of one’s own mind. All truth claims would thus be verifiable strictly by reference to those claims already accepted as true within the perceptual wall. All claims justified by other means or offered by other persons would vanish in a cloud of doubt.
The obvious problem with both positions is their demand for certainty as a requirement for knowledge, one inconsistent with innumerable conditions of ordinary life, so we turn reluctantly from certainty to doubt, for knowing what is true, good, and beautiful is a necessary condition of our existence. Honesty requires us to face both our need and our poverty in satisfying it.
But who says we need to be honest? One response to our dilemma is to turn to a spurious certainty by exaggerating what we can know about truth, goodness, and beauty. Another is to redefine these terms to make knowledge of them easier to attain.
All efforts to pierce the perceptual wall by revelation, insight, inspiration, memories of the ideal, pantheistic intuition, transcendental experience, and so on are designed to give certainty without universal verification. To the coherentist, these methods confer true knowledge if what they reveal agrees in content and mode of transmission with her virtual circle, her schema of previously accepted ideas. For example, she could hardly embrace divine revelation if her virtual circle did not already include belief in a deity, nor could the content of that revelation hold truth for her if it disputed beliefs already held as true or moral imperatives already embraced as good. The correspondentist faces a higher bar in verifying such efforts because both the means of transmission and the knowledge thus conveyed have to be universally verifiable—meaning knowable to any observer—and such claims often produce doubt and disagreement that cannot be resolved by reference to the reality they purport to reveal. In previous posts, I have explored issues of religious claims as an example of the problem of claiming correspondence truth using either coherence means of justification or authority as a correspondence means.
If all mystical efforts to eliminate problems of justification testify to our deep need for truth, goodness, and beauty, so too do the efforts of some thinkers to change the terms of the discussion. I will stipulate that they participate in a long intellectual conversation aiming at a moving target. So long as mystical means of knowing conferred a sense of certainty—conditions lasting until the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century—thinkers felt comfortable demanding a very strong sense of certainty for truth, goodness, and beauty claims. Once epistemological doubt reared its ugly head, the demands began to subside, so that we may claim knowledge today with only a preponderance of the available evidence on our side. If the definition of truth is so flaccid and so flexible, why not go all the way? Wouldn’t it be even easier to claim if we defined it as “whatever works”? At least, this was the thinking of the Pragmatists of the earlier twentieth century, who chose to define truth and goodness as so contextualized as to be indeterminable outside the specific situation to which the terms are applied. Such thinking leads to coherentism as it was formulated later in the century. We may choose similarly to define goodness in its moral form as values and in our judgments of quality and aesthetics as taste. These kinds of efforts reduce the difficulties of verifying our truth, goodness, and beauty claims by redefining the meaning of the terms. In practice, all such reductive efforts end in coherentism.
I should briefly mention that correspondentists are equally prone to a false reductionism. The most obvious example is the prevalence of scientism in post-industrial culture, the fervent desire to dismiss all issues not open to empirical verification. Science is such a praiseworthy endeavor that we wish to amplify its truth-finding skill, but that very skill derives from the limitations of its methodology. Attempting to apply empirical methodology inappropriately has led to the manifold errors of the pseudo-sciences and the human sciences. Attempting to dismiss any investigation not open to empirical method as nonsense has led to the arrogance of scientists who implausibly dismiss all questions of goodness and beauty as irrelevant because such questions are unsuited to their mode of inquiry. Another correspondentist error has been to demand such rigor in rational investigations that issues without strictly definable parameters and closed rationalist systems simply disappear from discussions, as evidenced by the work of the logical positivist philosophers. I need not mention that most issues pertinent to human life are not so easily disposed of. Oddly, when strong empiricists and strict rationalists do attempt to address such issues using the kinds of techniques we all must use in everyday life, their thinking seem as fallible as our own. I am thinking here of Freud’s letters, Bertrand Russell’s social critiques, and Stephen Hawking and Richard Dawkins’ religious commentary; these all demonstrate a spectrum of human fallibility.
I hope I have made two things clear in this brief survey of our zeitgeist’s efforts to simplify the search for truth, goodness, and beauty. First, no such effort succeeds. Second, we continue to try. Imagine the brashest ignoramus proudly touting his own narrow views. He is proclaiming truth. He offers a theory of goodness. He cannot help himself. He’s human.
Next week, I’ll investigate some better ways to slice this pie.